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Abstract 
 
The arrival of any piece of unsolicited and unwanted email, commonly referred to as 
spam, is a source of annoyance to many email users.  It results in real costs to 
individuals and organisations.  Spam also contributes to a reluctance to use email by 
some individuals.  Currently most spam prevention techniques rely on methods that 
examine the whole email message at the mail server.  This thesis details research that 
aims to deny spam entry into the internal network, stopping it ever reaching the mail 
server.  A system is described that can identify current potential spammer IP 
addresses in real-time and then inform all network gateways to block emails from 
those addresses.  Various tests of the system’s timeliness and efficiency are then 
illustrated, leading to a final conclusion of the system’s viability and overall 
usefulness.  This is followed by a discussion of various areas in which future 
research could be carried out. 
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1 Introduction 
Unsolicited bulk email, commonly referred to as spam, is a major concern for the 
email infrastructure.  Email is now a significant communications channel and could 
arguably be described as an essential form of communication in today’s connected 
society.  As the community so heavily relies on email, anything negatively affecting 
the functionality of the email infrastructure severely threatens its usefulness as a 
communications medium.   
 
It is hard to determine the exact proportion of spam compared with regular email, 
with various reports listing figures of anywhere between 2.5% - 10% in 1998 (Cranor 
and LaMacchia 1998) to 60% in 2005 (MessageLabs 2005).  While the spam 
message proportion is difficult to determine, there is no doubt that it is increasing, as 
the above figures show.  Regardless of the specific percentage that spam accounts 
for, it is undoubtedly significant enough that large amounts of time and money are 
currently being spent to combat the rising tide of spam messages.  
 
This thesis will begin by outlining the impact spam has on individuals, companies 
and the general perception of the usefulness of the email system.  Next, the 
motivation for sending spam will be discussed, along with the techniques currently 
used by spammers.   A new method of spam detection and prevention is then 
proposed, designed to reduce the amount of resources consumed by spam within a 
network.  This is followed by an analysis of the viability, usefulness and 
effectiveness of the system.  The thesis concludes with a summary combined with 
suggestions for future research within the area of network-based spam detection and 
prevention. 
1.1 What is Spam? 
The term “spam” has many definitions.  A report published for the Australian 
Government by the National Office for the Information Economy (NOIE) defines 
spam as “unsolicited electronic messages, usually transmitted to a large number of 
Catching Spam Before It Arrives  Introduction 
  2 
recipients” (2003, p. 6).  Spam is also commonly referred to as Unsolicited 
Commercial Email (UCE) or Unsolicited Bulk Email (UBE).  The same NOIE report 
also notes that spam messages share one or more of the following characteristics: 
 
• They are sent in an untargeted and indiscriminate manner, often by automated 
means. 
• They include or promote illegal or offensive content. 
• Their purpose is fraudulent or otherwise deceptive. 
• They collect or use personal information in breach of the Privacy Act 1988 
National Privacy Principles (NPPs). 
• They are sent in a manner that disguises the originator. 
• They do not offer a valid and functional address to which recipients may send 
messages opting out of receiving further unsolicited messages. 
 
These characteristics are aimed at not only defining spam messages, but also to 
differentiate spam from legitimate bulk email.  Bulk email is considered legitimate if 
the recipient has voluntarily had a previous business relationship with the sender and 
it can be reasonably assumed that the recipient would like to receive the message.  
Legitimate bulk email also includes any mailing lists the receiver has signed up for 
that provide an “opt-out” feature; allowing the user to remove their email address 
from the list at any time. 
 
Spam is not restricted to the domain of email either.  Spam can also be found in other 
places such as USENET groups and web logs (blogs).  Recent reports suggest spam 
has moved to instant messaging services such as AOL Instant Messenger and MSN 
Messenger, creating a phenomenon known as spim (Paulson 2004).  Spam has also 
spread to text-messaging services on mobile phones and personal digital assistants 
(PDAs).  This is a concern because whereas the receipt of an email message 
generally bears little or no cost, recipients of mobile phone marketing may have to 
pay for the cost of the message (Pfleeger and Bloom 2005).  Whilst these other 
methods of spam exist, this thesis is specifically focussed on dealing with email 
spam. 
Catching Spam Before It Arrives  Introduction 
  3 
1.2 The Impact of Spam 
Spam wastes time, money and resources at many levels of a networks’ infrastructure.  
If spam messages make it all the way to a user’s inbox, then manually removing this 
spam wastes the user’s time and if that user is at work then it is also costing their 
employer money in lost productivity.  Conservative estimates indicate that the total 
cost of spam on users (worldwide) in 2001 was  €10 billion (approximately AU$16 
billion) a year (Gauthronet and Drouard 2001).  Other reports estimate that spam cost 
US companies alone $10 billion (approximately AU$13 billion) in lost productivity 
in 2003 (Bekker 2003). 
 
Spam also consumes valuable computing resources.  Every unsolicited email 
consumes bandwidth and network resources regardless of whether users actually 
receive it (Whitworth and Whitworth 2004).  Spam messages cause delays for all 
Internet users as they waste resources on the Internet backbone, the fundamental 
infrastructure of the Internet.  Furthermore, as some spammers use dictionary attacks 
and outdated address lists, many messages are rejected as being invalid by the 
receiving mail server and “bounced” back to the sender (Garcia et al. 2004), wasting 
even more Internet resources.  Also, running any sort of spam filter on a mail server 
removes processing time from the server’s major purpose: delivering email.  It is 
worth noting that the people who are making money out of spam are generally not 
the people who bear the full impact of dealing with the spam messages. 
 
A further cost of spam is its psychological effect on users regarding their willingness 
to communicate via email.  According to a report published by the PEW Internet & 
American Life Project (Fallows 2003), 25% of email users surveyed admit that the 
ever-increasing volume of spam has reduced their overall use of email with 60% of 
those saying that it has reduced their email use in a significant way.  Furthermore, 
30% of email users are concerned that their filtering systems may block incoming 
legitimate messages and 23% are concerned that their emails to others may be 
blocked by filtering systems.  These concerns initially seem rather conservative or 
perhaps even paranoid, but the truth is they are inevitably grounded in reality; 
customers of various Australian Internet Service Providers recently ended up having 
legitimate email blocked by Telstra’s BigPond mail servers after their Internet 
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Service Providers were blacklisted by Telstra’s spam filtering system (LeMay 2005).  
The numbers above also serve to further highlight the effect spam has on the public’s 
perception of the usefulness of email.  If the amount of spam saturating users’ 
inboxes continues to increase, there is a very real threat that the general public will 
eventually abandon email for other, less frustrating methods of communication. 
1.3 Spammer Motivation and Techniques 
When the above impacts and costs of spam are taken into account, it is feasible to ask 
the question: ‘Why does spam continue to exist?’  The answer to this is simply that 
no matter how strange a concept it may seem, spam gets results.  A small percentage 
of email users actually do buy products advertised through spam emails.  While the 
public perception of spam is largely negative, spammers would not be operating if it 
were not a viable source of income.  Weiss (2003) notes that a spammer only needs 
to receive one hundred responses out of ten million spam messages (0.001% 
acceptance) to turn a profit.  As the acceptance of offers contained in spam emails is 
generally proportional to the amount of people that the email is sent to, it makes 
economic sense for spammers to send the message to as many people as possible.   
 
In order to reach a large volume of users, spammers require an equally large number 
of email addresses.  These are usually collected in three different ways: by using 
programs known as spam-bots to scavenge for email addresses listed on web sites 
and message boards (particularly USENET groups), by performing a dictionary 
attack (pairing randomly generated usernames with known domain names to ‘guess’ 
a correct address) or by purchasing address lists from other individuals or 
organisations (Pfleeger and Bloom 2005). 
 
Once they have addresses, spammers can use programs known as “bulk mailers” to 
automate the sending of spam.  These programs can send huge volumes of email 
messages in a small amount of time.  Some bulk mailing programs use open-relays 
(email servers that allow unauthorised users to send email) to send messages, 
effectively hiding the true address of the spammer.  Bulk mailers can also fabricate 
the from address in email message headers to further hide the identity of the 
spammer (Garcia et al. 2004). 
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Another technique spammers utilise to send emails is with the use of zombie 
networks, also know as bot networks.  Zombie is the term given to a computer that 
has been infected by a virus, worm, or Trojan Horse (Levy 2003), which allows 
remote entities to take control and use it for their own (usually illegal) purposes.  A 
large amount of these computers, usually called a network or army can be co-opted to 
send spam emails, requiring little of the spammer’s own computing power and 
network bandwidth.  This technique is also popular as it protects the identity of the 
spammer (Paulson 2004). 
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2 Literature Review 
The Introduction section discussed the effects of spam and analysed the reasons why 
people send spam.  The next step is to discuss the techniques that are available to 
combat spam.  This chapter looks in detail at various techniques and technologies 
currently employed to protect against the receipt of spam messages: where in the 
network these technologies can be applied and what action can be taken when a spam 
message has been identified.  This section also provides some background 
information about the primary sources of data for this research; namely audit log 
files. 
 
The most popular techniques currently employed to prevent the arrival of spam 
generally revolve around the use of filters.  Filters examine various parts of an email 
message to determine whether or not it is spam.  Filtering systems can be further 
classified based on the parts of the email messages that they use for spam detection.  
Origin or address-based filters typically use network information for spam 
classification, while content filters examine the actual contents of email messages.  
Sender authentication systems use network information in conjunction with changes 
to the email sending system in order to identify spam messages (Haskins and Nielsen 
2005). 
 
The two main places in the network infrastructure where spam detection and 
prevention technologies can operate are at the mail server and at individual users’ 
computers (Haskins and Nielsen 2005).  Filtering at the host (user) level allows 
individual users to tailor the filtering system to closely fit their personal definition of 
what constitutes a spam message.  In contrast, spam filters that operate at the mail 
server have to offer a reasonable level of protection for all of the users they service, 
while simultaneously trying to produce the lowest amount of false positives in order 
to cater to all the users’ different views on what constitutes spam.  It must be 
remembered that one person’s spam message could be another’s interesting email.  
As regular network users generally do not get to provide input into spam filtering 
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policies at the mail server, it is important to respect their interests and try to ensure 
that the filter does not block any legitimate email or if this is not possible, only 
blocks a small proportion. 
2.1 Taking Action 
When an email has been classified as spam, either at the mail server or at an 
individual host, there are multiple ways that it can be dealt with.  One solution is to 
simply delete the message so that it never gets to the user.  This quickly frees up 
resources on the mail server or host machine, the downside of which is that users are 
not aware of exactly what has been deleted.  Another solution is to redirect messages 
classified as spam to another, lower priority inbox.  This process is known as 
sidelining and it protects the user from receiving spam directly into their primary 
inbox and also allows them the flexibility to periodically examine this low priority 
inbox to check for wrongly classified legitimate email.  This method loses its 
effectiveness as the amount of spam a user receives increases, as this makes it more 
difficult to find legitimate emails in the spam filled lower priority inbox.  A further 
downside to this approach is that the spam messages are still taking up resources on 
the mail server or host machine while they remain in the lower priority inbox 
(Haskins and Nielsen 2005).  Other techniques include only censoring the main 
message, while still forwarding the email header onto the recipient.  This allows the 
recipient or the network administrator to determine if a legitimate email has been 
blocked and has the opportunity to contact the originator of the blocked message. 
2.2 Origin-Based Filters 
Origin-based filters use information contained in the network headers of email 
messages to detect spam.  IP and email address are the most common pieces of 
network information used.  The three major types of origin-based filters are 
blacklists, whitelists and challenge/response systems. 
2.2.1 Blacklists 
Blacklists, also known as realtime blackhole lists (RBL) or domain name system 
black lists (DNSBL), can filter mail from mail servers or domains that have sent 
spam or are suspected of doing so.  IP addresses of known or suspected spammers 
are entered into centrally maintained databases and made available as blacklists 
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through the Internet.  Standard DNS lookups are used to query these databases at the 
time of Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) connection or when mail is received, 
with spam classification occurring based on the reply given. 
 
Blacklists are managed by various separate groups; each with its own focus and 
different policies in regards to how an IP address gets on (and off) the list (Allman 
2003).  Blacklist focus could include Request For Comments (RFC1) compliance, 
open relays, open proxies, IP addresses or domains that spam has actually come from 
or even dial-up users.  RFC compliance refers to the checking of email messages to 
determine whether they comply with the various RFC documents listing email 
standards and conventions.  An open relay is a mail server that does not require user 
authentication to send email, allowing anyone to send mail through the server.  An 
open proxy is an unauthenticated proxy server that allows anyone to connect to it 
(and send spam).  Dial-up users are also the focus of some blacklists, as most 
legitimate mail servers do not run over dial-up connections. 
 
Blacklists also differ in how aggressive they are at categorizing spam sources; some 
lists prioritise avoiding false positives.  A false positive is a legitimate email 
incorrectly classified as a spam message.  Other more aggressive blacklists aim to 
catch the largest percentage of spam (which usually produces more false positives).  
Popular blacklists include Trend Micro’s RBL+ (formally MAPS) (Trend Micro 
RBL+ Service 2005), the SPEWS list (Spam Prevention Early Warning System 2005) 
and the Spamhaus SBL and XBL lists (The Spamhaus Project 2005). 
 
As blacklists only require DNS lookups, they have a very low CPU overhead and are 
generally easy to implement.  Another advantage of blacklists is that they allow spam 
to be blocked at the SMTP connection phase, effectively stopping it from entering 
the network.  Blacklists are not without disadvantages however, an example of such 
is the fact that they are maintained by an external entity.  These lists could potentially 
be removed at any time without warning, leaving networks solely relying on these 
blacklists without any form of spam protection at all.  A further downside of 
blacklists is that they are not as dynamic as other spam protection technologies, 
                                                 
1
 a collection of open Internet standards 
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making them easier for spammers who frequently change their IP address to avoid.  
Also, IP addresses that were once hijacked by a spammer could remain blocked for 
much longer than they need be, potentially leading to false positives.  The 
effectiveness of a blacklist relies on the people who manage them; if blacklists are 
not updated in a timely manner, spam can get through.   
 
Additionally, some blacklist providers (particularly SPEWS) neglect to specify the 
policies used to add and remove addresses from the list, effectively forcing network 
administrators who use these lists to trust in the judgement of other people.  These 
blacklist providers could also potentially add addresses to their blacklist that the 
network needs to receive email from.  Buisnesses could also be affected by this if 
they are blocked simply because their Internet Service Provider has a history of 
sending spam or if previous owners of their current IP space were spammers (Lueg 
2004).  There is no way to determine if this has taken place unless the network 
administrator can detect the lack of email coming from the specific address or 
domain.  Blacklists can also be maintained locally, but they require a large amount of 
maintenance from the network administrator to retain their usefulness. 
 
Another problem with blacklists is that as the amount of spam increases, the number 
of DNS lookups to check blacklists increases.  Mail servers that use more than one 
blacklist are particularly affected by this.  A study conducted at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory 
found that blacklist DNS lookups accounted for 14% of all their DNS lookups in 
2004, up from less than 0.4% in 2000 (Jung and Sit 2004). 
 
Spammers can circumvent blacklists to a certain degree by using zombie networks 
(as described in Section 1.3).  As a zombie network comprises of many different 
computers, all of which could be from different domains, a blacklist on a specific 
domain would provide only minimal spam protection. 
2.2.2 Whitelists 
Whitelists allow users to specifically define “trusted” addresses that will immediately 
classify as legitimate all email received from those addresses (Pfleeger and Bloom 
2005).  Mail will only be accepted into the normal inbox if the sender exists on the 
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whitelist, so new contacts need to be added to the whitelist before effective 
correspondence can begin.  An appealing quality of whitelists is that for most users a 
whitelist would be significantly smaller and easier to maintain than a blacklist.  Also, 
mail flagged by a whitelist as legitimate can bypass further spam filters, effectively 
reducing the load on those filters.   
 
A problem with whitelists, however, is that since the sender of email messages is not 
authenticated, spammers who can guess an address on the whitelist can then freely 
propagate spam to that address (Allman 2003).  Additionally, if used by themselves, 
whitelists can tend to be overly restrictive as it is almost inevitable that legitimate 
mail will eventually be blocked or filtered into a lower priority mailbox.    If this 
lower priority mailbox contains a large amount of spam, searching for valid 
messages could become a very difficult task.  Whitelists are, therefore, best used 
when combined with other spam blocking techniques (Garcia et al. 2004). 
2.2.3 Challenge/Response Systems 
Challenge/response systems are an advanced version of whitelists, allowing senders 
who are not on the whitelist to have their emails received.  Incoming messages from 
addresses not on the whitelist trigger an automatic reply (or challenge) to the sender, 
requiring them to prove that they are a real user and not an automated mailer.  For 
example, the sender may be required to click on a link in the reply message and enter 
a valid email address and the ID number of the response message.  If this process is 
completed, then the email successfully passes through the challenge/response system 
(Pfleeger and Bloom 2005).   
 
The challenge/response method aims to protect against automated mailer programs 
by forcing the user to complete a task that is simple for a human but too complicated 
for a program to handle.  Challenge/response systems also protect against spammers 
who manually send email, as the time required to complete the challenge could be 
better used sending spam to additional addresses.  Challenge/response systems also 
help to protect against the generally large amount of false positives generated by 
traditional whitelist systems. 
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One problem with challenge/response systems is the issue of deadlock.  If two parties 
who have never corresponded before both run challenge/response systems, the 
challenge sent by the recipient’s system will be caught by the sender’s 
challenge/response system and neither party will have the opportunity to provide an 
appropriate response (Barracuda Networks (Date Unknown)).  This problem could be 
alleviated if the original sender adds the recipient’s address to their whitelist (either 
manually or automatically) before commencing communication. 
 
Another problem associated with the use of challenge/response systems is legitimate 
automated email lists that the user has subscribed to.  These lists cannot respond to 
the challenge messages generated by the system, and mail from these sources may be 
marked as spam.  As with the deadlock issue, this problem could be alleviated if the 
subscriber adds the mailing list address to their whitelist before subscribing to the 
list.  Like whitelists, challenge/response systems are also as susceptible to a spammer 
guessing a whitelisted address, therefore allowing spam to get through. 
2.3 Content Filters 
While origin-based filters such as whitelists and blacklists examine email headers 
and other network information, content filters detect spam by looking inside the 
email and examining the message contents.  Most content-based spam detection 
systems try to “understand” the text to various extents in order to identify spam 
(Allman 2003).  A simple word filter, for example, could look to see if the message 
contains the words Viagra or sex or the phrases “buy now” or “you’ve won” to 
determine whether it is spam.  Filters based on this technique are commonly called 
keyword-based filters.  These filters can be highly context sensitive though, as a 
pharmacy may not want emails with the word Viagra in them filtered out.  Popular 
content filter types include Bayesian filters and rule-based filters. 
2.3.1 Bayesian Filters 
Spam filtering systems using Naïve Bayesian classification were originally proposed 
by two separate parties at the AAAI-98 Workshop on Learning for Text 
Categorization; one was by Pantel and Lin (1998) and the other was by Microsoft 
Research (Sahami et al. 1998).  Bayesian (also known as statistical) filters work by 
analysing the words inside an email message to calculate the probability that it is 
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spam.  This probability is based on not only those words that provide evidence that a 
message is spam, but also on those words that provide evidence that a message is not 
spam.  Words that are not generally found in spam messages contribute to the 
probability value in very much the same way as words that are frequently found in 
spam messages (Graham 2003). 
 
To calculate an email’s spam probability with a good degree of accuracy, Bayesian 
filters need to be “trained” by being given examples of what constitutes a spam email 
and what does not.  The advantage of this technique is that, given appropriate time 
and training data, Bayesian filters can achieve a combination of extremely high 
accuracy rates with a low percentage of false positives (Graham 2003).  The low 
amount of false positives generated by a Bayesian filter is useful, as users generally 
regard the classification of legitimate emails as spam as an order of magnitude worse 
than receiving spam incorrectly classified as legitimate (see Section 1.2).  A further 
advantage of Bayesian filters is that they are constantly self-adapting.  Provided they 
receive ongoing training data from the user, Bayesian filters evolve to stop new spam 
techniques. 
 
The disadvantage of Bayesian filters is that, like all other content filters, they require 
the entire message to be received before analysis can begin.  Furthermore, it follows 
that Bayesian filters are generally more CPU intensive than origin-based filters, as 
calculating Bayesian probabilities requires significantly more processing power than 
simply querying a list, as in systems such as blacklists and whitelists. 
2.3.2 Rule-Based Filters 
Rule-based, or heuristic, filters search the email message for patterns that indicate 
spam.  These patterns could include specific words or phrases, malformed message 
headers and large amounts of exclamation marks and capital letters.  Detection of a 
specific pattern attributes an amount of points to an email message and once the 
point value of an email exceeds a set threshold, it is classified as spam.  Rule-based 
filters were the most common type of spam filter until 2002, when Bayesian filters 
became popular (Graham 2003). 
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The major disadvantage of rule-based filters is maintenance in general.  In order to 
update the system to deal with the latest spammer techniques, new rule sets need to 
be obtained at regular intervals.  Since the rule sets are largely static, they are easily 
defeated by spammer techniques such as word obfuscation.  For example, a rule-
based filter that checks for the word Free will not be able to detect the string 
F*r*e*e as spam.  It is incredibly difficult to include rules for every possible 
misspelling of common spam words, which has limited the effectiveness of such 
filters. 
2.4 Other Filters 
While the above filters are the most commonly used spam filtering techniques, it is 
by no means an exhaustive list.  Other data mining, machine learning and text 
classification techniques currently under research include: digest-based filters 
(Damiani et al. 2004), density-based filters (Yoshida et al. 2004), Chi-squared filters 
(O'Brien and Vogel 2003), global collaboration filters (Hulten et al. 2004) and 
artificial neural networks (Drewes 2002).  Social network techniques, such as 
Reputation Network Analysis are also under investigation (Golbeck and Hendler 
2004). 
 
It should also be noted that the various spam filtering methods described are by no 
means mutually exclusive.  A popular spam filtering program, SpamAssassin (The 
Apache SpamAssassin Project 2005), uses a combination of Bayesian filtering, rule-
based filtering and blacklist checking to calculate a spam score for a particular email 
message.  Messages that exceed a particular user-defined threshold are then marked 
as spam and dealt with appropriately.  The advantage of this technique is that it can 
make use of the strengths of each spam filtering technology while also being less 
susceptible to each of the various technologies’ weaknesses. 
2.5 Sender Authentication Systems 
In contrast to filtering systems, which examine various parts of email messages in 
order to detect spam, sender authentication systems operate on the idea that if the 
actual sender of an email message can be verified it will be easier to identify (and 
then block) spammers.  According to Delaney (2005, p. 4), “Creating email 
authentication is the first step to returning dispositional control of email to the 
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recipient.”  The aim of sender authentication is to make senders of email more 
accountable.  These systems force the identity of senders to be properly verified, 
thereby allowing people to block spammers more efficiently.   
 
Sender authentication systems should also lower the effectiveness of email fraud 
systems, such as phishing scams and the Nigerian fraud (Costales and Flynt 2005).  
Phishing is the term used to describe when an apparently legitimate looking email is 
sent to try to deceive the recipient into revealing various personal details, usually 
account login information.  Phishing works because victims believe the email has 
come from a legitimate institution that they have dealt with before.  Sender 
authentication systems should make it harder for phishers as they will no longer be 
able to assume the email addresses of the legitimate institutions their messages 
purport to be from (Delany 2005).  Sender authentication systems have the added 
benefit of immediately blocking spam with no sender identification or if sender 
identification has been forged.  Different types of sender authentication systems 
include reverse DNS, the Sender Policy Framework, the Sender ID Framework and 
DomainKeys. 
2.5.1 Reverse DNS/ Reverse MX 
Reverse DNS (also known as reverse MX or reverse mail exchange) systems were 
developed to combat the problem of email IP address spoofing.  SMTP contains no 
facilities to authenticate the true sender of the message.  To combat this, Danisch 
(2004) describes a system to validate sender identity without having to resort to using 
processor expensive cryptography.  Reverse DNS and reverse MX combat spam by 
querying the DNS server of the sender’s mail transfer agent and running a check to 
determine if the IP address of the incoming SMTP connection is authorized to send 
messages from the mail transfer agent.  Pfleeger and Bloom comment that pure 
Reverse DNS systems tend to be unreliable because IP addresses can map to multiple 
domains (2005).  AT&T WorldNet deployed a reverse DNS system in 2003 but had 
to remove it only 24 hours later when it was found that a great deal of legitimate mail 
was being blocked (Olsen 2003). 
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2.5.2 The Sender Policy Framework 
The Sender Policy Framework (SPF) is another proposed solution to address 
spoofing and builds upon Danisch’s Reverse MX system (2004) and the Designated 
Mailers Protocol proposed by Gordon Fecyk (2003).  SPF was designed by Meng 
Wong of POBOX2 and uses reverse MX information, published in the DNS record of 
a domain, to determine whether the mail exchange sending the email is authorised to 
send mail from the domain.  SPF examines the mail from: parameter of the incoming 
message and can also examine the HELO (or EHLO) parameter from the sending 
SMTP server to determine if the message has come from an authorized sender in the 
domain (Wong and Schlitt 2004).  Figure 2.1 shows an example of what a SPF 
record would look like in a DNS lookup:  
Figure 2.1: Sample SPF record (Grote 2004) 
 
The above DNS lookup record comprises of four pieces of information.  The v=spf1 
denotes the SPF version being used, in this case version 1, +mx denotes the listing is 
a valid mail exchange, a:colo.example.com/28 identifies the reverse lookup address 
of the authorized outbound mail server and the –all specifies that if the domains do 
not match, reject the message as a forgery.  If a message from another domain is 
received that lists its source address as example.com, the receiving mail server will 
deemed to have been forged and be rejected at the SMTP connection attempt (Grote 
2004).  It is important to note that SPF is dependent on DNS lookups, and is 
therefore only as secure as the DNS itself.  This is somewhat of an issue, as 
vulnerabilities of the DNS root servers have recently been exploited (Baranowski 
2003).  
2.5.3 The Sender ID Framework 
The Sender ID Framework is Microsoft’s attempt at defining a standard for SMTP 
message authentication.  It is heavily based on Wong’s SPF (see Section 2.5.2) and 
also draws on Lyon’s Purported Responsible Address proposal (2004).  Sender ID 
employs SPF records in order to determine if a specific email message has been 
                                                 
2
 http://spf.pobox.com 
v=spf1 +mx a:colo.example.com/28 -all 
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received from an authorized host.  Sender ID proposes the concept of ‘positional 
modifiers’ in the SPF records published in a DNS, which address some weaknesses 
in the SPF specification by modifying the outcome of the SPF check_host() function 
to examine the scope of the mail server in question (Lyon and Wong 2004).  Figure 
2.2 shows the steps in the Sender ID Framework authentication process: 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Sender ID operation (Microsoft Corporation 2005) 
The following are the major steps in the Sender ID authorisation: 
 
1. The sender transmits an email message to the receiver’s mail server 
2. The receivers mail server receives the message over SMTP 
3. The receiver’s inbound mail server queries the DNS of the sender’s outbound 
mail server and checks to see if there is an SPF record that matches the 
address recorded in the SMTP session. 
4. If the addresses match, the sender of the message is authenticated and the 
mail is made available to the recipient. 
 (Microsoft Corporation 2005) 
 
The Sender ID Framework initially came under criticism from the open source 
community (including the Debian Project and the Apache Software Foundation), as 
the license to use it was not compatible with the GPL3.  This prompted the authors of 
the original Sender ID Internet-Draft to refine the original specifications proposals 
and re-submit them to the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) for comment and 
                                                 
3
 The open source General Public License 
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consensus (Wagner 2004).  There has been no word of late from Microsoft regarding 
the current state of this proposal. 
2.5.4 DomainKeys 
The DomainKeys approach to sender authentication utilises public/private key 
cryptography in association with DNS to verify both the identity of the sender and 
the integrity of the received email message.  In order to implement the DomainKeys 
system, a domain owner must create one or more public/private keypairs that will be 
used for digitally signing valid emails sent from that domain.  The domain owner 
places the public key in the DNS record associated with the domain and makes the 
private key available to all authorized mail servers in the domain.  When a message 
is to be sent, the following takes place (Delany 2005):  
 
1. The outbound mail server digitally signs the message with its private key.  
The digital signature of the message is then stored inside the header of the 
message and the message is sent to the recipient’s mail server.  The default 
signature is an RSA signed SHA-1 digest of the entire email (including 
headers). 
2. The inbound mail server receives the message and extracts the signature and 
the claimed domain from the message headers. 
3. The inbound mail server queries the DNS of the claimed domain for its public 
key. 
4. The inbound mail server uses the sending domain’s public key to verify if the 
message was signed with the corresponding private key, and thus, whether 
the message was sent with the authorization of the claimed sending domain.  
This will also verify that the message has not been altered whilst in transit. 
 
The DomainKeys system only aims at authenticating the sender at the domain level; 
it provides no assurance that a given message comes from the purported user inside 
that domain.  The responsibility of authenticating users within the domain rests with 
the outgoing mail server, which should only sign a message with its private key if it 
can verify the identity of the message originator. 
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As the DNS of the sending mail server is only used for public key storage and 
retrieval, the DomainKeys system can address some of the shortfalls in the SPF 
specification.  While the DomainKeys specification still recommends that the signing 
services be deployed at the email boundary of an organisation (after all possible 
message header modification has been completed), two canonicalization algorithms 
are proposed to combat the fact that some components of the message header may be 
modified by internal relay services after the message has been signed.  These 
algorithms can allow for some minor modification of message headers whilst still 
verifying integrity of the message. 
 
One drawback with using public/private key cryptography to authenticate sender 
domain and message integrity is that it is more computationally expensive than using 
a reverse MX system like SPF or the Sender ID Framework.  This increased 
processing time could become a major issue for email providers who process large 
amounts of mail.  A further issue to be considered is that the mail servers need to be 
trusted to be secure enough to keep their private key secret.  Also, these servers need 
to be set up to only send mail from authorised users within the domain. 
2.6 Audit Log Analysis 
In order to create a system that can detect and respond to spam attacks in real-time, 
there needs to be a facility for the gateways and mail servers and even hosts to record 
what is happening at any given time.  This facility is provided by the use of audit 
logs.  Audit logs have long been used in computer security to detect intrusions; 
Clifford Stoll, for example, used system printouts to detect and track a hacker 
intruding into the Berkeley University computer network (1991). 
 
Audit log information can come from a variety of sources, including operating 
systems, firewalls, routers, mail servers and third party software (Amoroso 1999).  
As all these sources can produce a large amount of information, choosing the right 
system events to audit is of crucial importance.  There is always a trade-off between 
the amount of information a system collects (how thorough the audit log will be) and 
the amount of system overhead the logging processes and stored log files use 
(Kemmerer and Vigna 2002).  Generating too much log data makes it harder to 
analyse all the information, while not generating enough data may lead to an 
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ineffective system.  The primary sources of audit log data used in this research 
project are syslog files, generated by the Linux kernel firewall, the PortSentry 
intrusion detection system and the Sendmail mail transfer agent. 
2.6.1 Syslog 
The UNIX system logger (syslog) is a commonly used logging application and it 
provides the log sources for this research.  Syslog provides a way for different 
processes, applications and devices to send log information to a centralised point, 
known as the syslog server (Lonvick 2001).  The three distinct sources that syslog 
events come from are: processes running on the local machine (the machine running 
the syslog daemon), kernel routines running on the local machine and processes 
running on other machines.  All messages contain the source of the message, the 
authorizations associated with the message, the priority assigned to the message and 
the content of the message.  For every message sent to the syslog server, a timestamp 
and message type keyword is appended, along with a new line character at the end.  
The syslog.conf file is consulted and the message is then handled in one of the 
following ways: sent to a file or specific UNIX device, sent to a user (e.g. root) or all 
users, sent to a program using the UNIX pipe command or sent to another machine 
(Amoroso 1999).  Table 2.1 shows five lines (sanitised) from a Syslog file while 
Table 2.2 explains what the various lines mean. 
 
1 Aug  1 04:42:01 ns1 portsentry[15060]: attackalert: SYN/Normal 
scan from host: 192.168.1.1/192.168.1.1 to TCP port: 135 
2 Aug  1 04:42:01 ns1 portsentry[15060]: attackalert: Host: 
192.168.1.1/192.168.1.1 is already blocked Ignoring 
3 Aug  1 04:42:02 ns1 kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0 PROTO=6 192.168.1.2:4285 192.168.1.3:135 L=48 S=0x00 I=18255 F=0x4000 
T=108 SYN (#145) 
4 Aug  1 04:43:14 ns1 portsentry[15060]: attackalert: SYN/Normal 
scan from host: 192.168.1.4/192.168.1.4 to TCP port: 135 
5 Aug  1 04:43:14 ns1 portsentry[15060]: attackalert: Host 192.168.1.4 has been blocked via dropped route using command: 
"/sbin/ipchains -I input -s 192.168.1.4 -j DENY -l" 
Table 2.1: Syslog file extract 
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1 PortSentry has detected a SYN/Normal scan from IP 192.168.1.1 to 
TCP port 135  
2 Another scan from the same address was detected.  Since it was 
blocked, it is simply a log entry that another probe was detected 
3 The kernel firewall has detected a scan from address 192.168.1.2 
to port 135.  This packet is denied entry to the network 
4 PortSentry has detected a SYN/Normal scan from IP 192.168.1.4 to 
TCP port 135 
5 PortSentry has created an ipchains command to DENY packets from 
192.168.1.4 entry to the network 
Table 2.2: Syslog entries explained 
2.6.2 Sendmail 
The mail server logs used in this research came from the Sendmail Mail Transfer 
Agent.  The Sendmail audit log entries are also written in syslog format, with a 
timestamp and message type keyword (in this case “sendmail”) appended before the 
main Sendmail line.  Table 2.3 shows three lines (sanitised) from a Sendmail log file, 
with the sending mail transfer agent’s IP address emphasised. 
 
1 Aug  1 04:43:28 ns1 sendmail[27026]: j6VIhPP27026: from=<hlsbing@spamdomain.de>, size=1305, class=0, nrcpts=1, 
msgid=<200507311843.j6VIhPP27026@example.com>, bodytype=8BITMIME, 
proto=SMTP, daemon=MTA, relay=c-67-171-253-79.ms1.example.com 
[192.168.1.1]  
2 Aug  1 05:25:32 ns1 sendmail[28999]: j6VJPSP28999: from=<LLIU4@RCN.COM>, size=812, class=0, nrcpts=1, 
msgid=<4344461122848585@fny94-3-82-225-104-67.fbx.eg.net>, 
proto=ESMTP, daemon=MTA, relay=fny94-3-82-225-104-67.fbx.eg.net 
[192.168.1.2] 
3 Aug  1 05:37:32 ns1 sendmail[29475]: j6VJbJP29475: from=<>, size=2158, class=0, nrcpts=1, 
msgid=<4c9d01c59601$7a89c406$a9403e31@ex2.net>, proto=SMTP, 
daemon=MTA, relay=host197.200-43-176.isp.net.ar [192.168.1.3] 
Table 2.3: Example Sendmail log lines 
 
This review has shown that there are many different issues to be considered when 
examining techniques to protect against spam.  Current spam prevention methods can 
operate at the host or mail filter level.  When running spam protection at the mail 
filter, a balance needs to be found that combines user satisfaction (low false positive 
rates) with actual spam protection (low false positives).  One of the problems with 
current systems is that there is no communication between spam filters of different 
mail servers within a single network, allowing spammers to reuse the same attacks 
against multiple mail servers in the same domain.  This presents a new avenue for 
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research: protection against spam through collaboration between multiple network 
gateways and mail servers.   
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3 Previous Work 
Christopher MacLeavy, as part of his 2004 Honours work, analysed the combined 
audit logs for all gateways within a single class C IP address.  SMTP (Sendmail) log 
files were compared with Linux syslog files in order to investigate if any precursor 
network activity could be detected on the network before the arrival of a spam 
message.  The steps MacLeavy carried out in this investigation are detailed below 
and shown in Figure 3.1: 
 
1. Examine each log file
2. Extract IP addresses
from SMTP log
List of IP
addresses
that send mail3. Search for matchinglog entries in syslog fileList of entries
which occur in
both SMTP
and syslog files
4. Compare timestamps
Potential precursor
activity
 
Figure 3.1: MacLeavy system operation (Adapted from MacLeavy (2004)) 
 
1. Both log file types were examined in order to determine the structure of the 
data and the different components inside 
2. The IP address from the relay field of each email message received was 
extracted and stored in a file 
3. For each IP address contained in the newly-created file, each line of the 
syslog file was searched for any entries containing a matching source address 
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4. For each syslog line flagged in the previous step, the timestamp was extracted 
and compared to the subsequent mail entry from the Sendmail log.  Entries 
from the syslog that occurred after the mail was received were discarded.  All 
other syslog entries still remaining in the result set were now considered 
potential precursor activity to the sending of spam. 
 
MacLeavy examined the output file and determined that precursor activity was 
occurring, though the proportion of spam with precursors compared to spam without 
precursors was not reported.  MacLeavy found that most precursor activity observed 
took the form of a probe to TCP port 0.  He strengthened this assertion by stating 
“There is no known motivation for a machine probing a receiving network before 
sending e-mail other than to ensure the safe arrival of spam.”  It was also found that 
63% of mail with a precursor arrives at the mail server less than sixty seconds after 
the aforementioned precursor.  Furthermore, 89% of spam arrives at the gateway less 
than 10 minutes after its precursor. 
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4 Methodology 
This thesis examines network precursors to spam, continuing the work started by 
Chris MacLeavy in 2004.  Specifically, the aim of this thesis is to determine whether 
it is feasible to build and operate a system that can identify spam precursors in real-
time and dynamically adapt to block spam packets at the network gateway.  This 
prevents these spam packets from entering the network at all, effectively reducing the 
load placed upon various internal network resources, most importantly lowering the 
amount of email messages that the mail server has to process.  With this aim in mind, 
the first task was to validate the results presented by Chris MacLeavy in his 2004 
Honours thesis.  The second task was to investigate whether a system can be created 
that can operate in real-time, detecting spam precursors and blocking spam messages 
access to the network. 
4.1 Multiple Gateway Protection 
One of the goals of this research was to provide spam protection across multiple 
network gateways in real-time.  Large networks often contain multiple computers 
that allow computers inside the network to access other connected networks or the 
Internet.  These computers also allow traffic from outside the network, for example 
email messages, to enter the network and proceed to their intended destination (in the 
case of email, this destination is the network’s mail server).  The computers that 
facilitate this connection between the inside and the outside of the network are 
known as gateways.  Large networks may also contain multiple mail servers.  The 
methods proposed in this thesis aim to provide correlation between all of a network’s 
mail servers in order to identify spam attacks that are occurring across one or more 
mail server, possibly coming in to the network through different gateways.  Once an 
attack is confirmed and the offending IP address identified, all network gateways 
need to be notified to block all traffic originating from this IP address from entering 
the network.  It must be noted that this IP is the address of the mail relay (mail 
transfer agent) that the spam originated from, and all subsequent references to 
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“Spammer IP” actually refers to the IP of the spamming relay.  Figure 4.1 shows a 
diagram of a simple network with three gateways connected to two mail servers. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Simplified network diagram 
With current forms of spam protection, all email messages that arrive at the gateways 
are forwarded to the network’s mail servers.  The mail servers then provide the first 
line of protection against spam messages and can filter them before they reach 
individual users.  The new spam protection system proposed in this research aims to 
stop spam messages at the network gateways, preventing them from entering the 
network. 
4.2 Phase 1 – Validation 
Validation of the MacLeavy system was an important step as the aims for this thesis 
are based on the results of MacLeavy’s work.  This phase was also needed due to the 
use of “live” audit log data in this research.  As some of the audit log files contained 
almost 300 MB of text (approximately two million lines) to cover a 21 day time 
period, they were deemed too large to sort through manually.  Therefore, a system 
was needed to reduce the logs to a manageable size and in the process, identify the 
sort of network activity to be examined in the real-time system.  The existing 
implementation of the MacLeavy system was deemed too inefficient to use for this 
validation exercise, as it consumed approximately 52% of the CPU resources of a 
Sun Sparc Ultra Enterprise 250 server (with dual 400 MHz UltraSparc-II processors 
and 2GB of memory) for the majority of 8 days (MacLeavy 2004, p. 32).  This 
Mail Server 1 Mail Server 2 
Gateway 1 Gateway 2 Gateway 3 
The Internet 
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resulted in the need for a new system to be developed based on MacLeavy’s 
methodology that could output results in significantly less time on the machine 
provided for this research: an 800MHz Pentium 3 with a total of 512MB of memory 
running the Ubuntu Linux operating system. 
4.2.1 Phase 1 System Overview 
The new system (hereafter referred to as the Phase 1 system) was developed in the 
Perl scripting language, using Perl’s powerful regular expression engine to traverse 
an amalgamated audit log spanning multiple gateways and mail servers.  Perl’s 
regular expression engine is ideally suited to large text-processing operations, 
allowing meaningful data to be easily extracted for large data sources by using 
pattern matching against regular expressions.  Figure 4.2 shows an overview of the 
operation of the Phase 1 system: 
 
Amalgamate logs
Enter activity data into
hash
Remove all hash entries 
with no email activity
Remove all hash entries 
with only email activity
Output hash information
to file for visual inspection
 
Figure 4.2: Phase 1 operation 
 
The first stage in the Phase 1 implementation was to amalgamate log data from all 
gateways and mail servers into a single file.  Entries were ordered by date and time, 
simulating the output that would result if all gateways and mail servers wrote audit 
log data to the same file.  This allows the system to analyse traffic occurring across 
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multiple gateways simultaneously, potentially identifying attacks that would be 
missed if only activity from a single network gateway was analysed. 
 
The second stage was to traverse the audit log, analyse each line to determine if it 
contained relevant data and if so, then place this data into a Perl hash table data 
structure (essentially an associative array) indexed by IP address.  Within each IP 
hash table entry, all log lines relevant to that IP address were stored in an array.  A 
hash table was used as it offered increased searching speed in data entry and 
extraction stages at the expense of high memory utilisation.  Memory utilisation was 
not of high concern as this Phase 1 system was never intended to run in real-time; it 
was more important to ensure that the system could operate as fast as possible in 
order to generate results in good time. 
 
Once activity data for all IP addresses was contained within the hash table, the next 
stage of the system involved reducing the amount of data in the hash table to only 
include data relevant to this investigation.  The first step in the data reduction stage 
was to remove all IP entries from the hash table that contained no email activity.  As 
the system that the audit logs supplied for this research used the Sendmail Mail 
Transfer Agent, this involved checking IP address entries in the hash for lines of the 
type sendmail.  No email activity meant that the IP has not sent any spam (in the time 
period covered by the log file) and was therefore not relevant to our results.  The 
second step in the data reduction stage was to remove all IP entries that only 
contained email activity.  The logic behind this was that we are only interested in IP 
addresses that have other precursor network activity entries.   
 
The final stage of the Phase 1 system was to print the remaining hash entries into an 
output text document for hand sorting and visual inspection.  This process involved 
manually sorting through the result set as well as the use of UNIX commands such as 
grep, wc and awk to collect statistical information.  Grep searches files for lines 
containing a match to a given pattern while awk provides further pattern matching 
functions.  The UNIX word count (wc) function was also used, mainly to count the 
number of lines produced by the output of grep and awk statements.  This allowed an 
insight to be gained into the frequency and types of network precursors to spam that 
appear in audit logs. 
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4.3 Phase 2 – Real-Time Operation 
The Phase 1 system was able to analyse audit logs from multiple gateways and mail 
servers to determine if and what precursors appeared before spam messages arrived.  
This system did not operate in real-time, however, as it had to index an entire log file 
into the hash table before potential precursor activity could be identified through 
manual inspection of the program’s output.  The goal for Phase 2 was to construct a 
system that can operate in real-time, dynamically detecting new spam precursors and 
taking appropriate action against IP addresses that are identified as sending spam.  
Once a precursor pattern was determined, the system needed to detect the occurrence 
of precursor activity and block all email from the offending IP address from entering 
the network.   This provides the system with the flexibility to adapt to the ever 
changing landscape of network precursors to spam. 
 
The Phase 2 system was built upon techniques developed for the Phase 1 system, 
making the necessary modifications for it to run in real-time.  One problem with 
Phase 1 which prevented fully automated operation was the identification of spam.  
As noted earlier, visual inspection of email headers was used in the Phase 1 system.  
For a real-time system, a method is needed to allow automated determination of 
spam messages.  The accuracy of this detection method is also important as the 
accuracy of the entire system depends in part upon this initial spam detection 
process.  The obvious choice for spam detection at this stage is the mail server’s own 
spam filter.  The use of this identification technique results in a much greater degree 
of certainty that a particular email is spam than could have been gained through the 
limited information contained in the mail server log.  Also, as the results obtained 
from Phase 1 testing indicated precursors were only observed in a very small 
proportion of emails (Section 5.1), it was decided that a new method for detecting the 
impending arrival of spam was needed (Section 5.2.1).  It was proposed that spam 
messages themselves could be used as precursors to spam, potentially indicating that 
the IP address that sent the original message was likely to send more. 
 
Another necessary modification of the Phase 1 system was to move away from the 
large hash to store log information.  The hash table created in the Phase 1 system 
consumed far too much memory to be used on operating gateways.  It was decided 
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that a better solution for a real-time system was to store this information in a 
database.  While the time required to insert and extract data from a database is 
significantly greater than using a hash table set up in memory, the use of a database 
offers greater robustness and flexibility.  This robustness is provided by the fact that 
a database stores information on secondary storage, whereas the hash was contained 
solely in memory.  If the computer running the program crashed or had to be 
rebooted for another reason, all the data stored in the hash table would be lost and the 
program would have to be restarted with no knowledge of previous events.  
Conversely, the use of a database would allow the program to start from where it left 
off after the computer was restarted as all of the data stored would still exist on 
secondary storage. 
 
The use of a database also allows the system to be more flexible, as many different 
processes can access the data stored within the database.  This provides support for 
separate programs to take action based on data contained within the database and 
also perform cleaning functions to prevent the database tables and firewall rules from 
using too many resources. 
 
The last major modification required of the Phase 1 system involved taking action 
against those IP addresses that are sending spam.  As the Phase 1 system was 
intended to identify the existence and attributes of spam precursors, no consideration 
was made in regards to what the system will do once a precursor has been identified.  
It must be noted that mail servers, especially those of large ISPs could very possibly 
be sending a mixture of both spam and legitimate email.  A mechanism was needed 
to ensure that action is only taken against IP addresses that send a large proportion of 
spam or those that do not send legitimate email.  To this end, the technique of 
Sequential Hypothesis Testing (Wald 1947) was used in a similar way to Jung et al. 
(2004) in the development of their Threshold Random Walk algorithm.  Essentially, 
Sequential Hypothesis Testing is a method for defining two hypotheses (a simple 
hypothesis and an alternative) and testing via successive observations to determine 
whether either hypothesis has been reached.  In the case of the Phase 2 system, a 
selection between two hypotheses was made, namely that a given IP address is either 
malicious or benign.  This was accomplished by calculating and assigning suspicion 
values to IP addresses.  Only once an IP address has been classified as malicious (i.e. 
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exceeded a particular spam suspicion threshold) will action be taken to block traffic 
from that IP into the network.  Also, if an IP address is classified as benign, then the 
system will not monitor any messages from this IP for a period of time, effectively 
letting them all go on to the mail server.  This provides the system with the scope to 
allow for large ISPs with a small amount of spammers to not have all of their 
legitimate email blocked and should at least minimise or perhaps eliminate the 
possibility that legitimate emails will be blocked by the system.  This is an important 
issue as the blocking of legitimate emails affects the public’s willingness to use the 
technology, as mentioned in Section 1.2. 
4.3.1 Phase 2 System Overview 
Receive IP and timestamp
of newly arrived spam
from spam filter 
Examine gateway logs
for precursor activity from
spam IP
Precursor activity found
No
Update database tables
and change sequential
hypothesis rating
Threshold reached
No
Classification
Add IP to ‘Benign IP’
table
Send rule to all gateways
to block IP address access
to network
Benign Malicious
Yes
Yes
Wait for spam filter to
classify an email as spam 
 
Figure 4.3: Phase 2 system operation 
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System Operation and Database Structure 
In its default state, the system has to wait for the spam filter to classify a received 
email as spam.  This is accomplished through the use of Perl’s Tail module (Grabnar 
2004).  Tail allows the system to monitor the spam filter log file and process each 
entry as it is added to the log.  When a new log line appears, the system uses a Perl 
regular expression to extract the timestamp and IP address related to the spam 
message.  Using Tail allows the system to approximate real-time operation, as it 
simulates monitoring an audit log file that is constantly changing.  A script was 
created to dynamically add lines from a static source log to this file, simulating a 
spam filter writing entries to a log file.  It was decided that there would be no limit 
placed on the speed at which the simulated log file was filled as this represents the 
maximum computational throughput the system would be subjected to.  This also 
helped to expose any previously unseen inefficiency in the system. 
 
Once a newly-added line from the simulated spam filter log has been processed and 
the timestamp and IP address extracted, the system then searches the gateway log up 
until the time of the spam filter log entry and adds all network activity from the spam 
IP address into the database.  The amount of time to look back in the log files to 
search for precursor activity is a major determinant in the efficiency and accuracy of 
the system.  Due to this, a major focus of this thesis is determining a log look back 
time that will offer the best compromise between system efficiency and accuracy.   
For this step, two database tables are used.  One table (IP Activity) stores information 
relating to each unique IP flagged by the spam filter.  This information includes the 
timestamps of the first and latest activity recorded from this address, the amount of 
portscans received from this address, the number of emails received from this 
address as well as the byte locations in the audit log of first and latest activity for the 
particular IP.  This table also includes the address’s current suspicion classification, 
which is used to classify IPs as malicious or benign.   
 
The second table used for the storage of data in this step is the Precursor table.  This 
table holds data relating to detected precursors, including the port numbers probed by 
each IP address and the number of times each port has been probed.  This table is not 
currently essential to the operation of the system but it allows tracking of different 
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types of precursor attacks which may be valuable for future research.  If the system 
already has precursor activity recorded for the IP address, the search through the 
gateway log will start at the line after the line relating to the last recorded precursor 
activity.  This prevents the system from recording the same precursor activity 
multiple times per unique IP.  This also increases the efficiency of operation of the 
system, as it does not have to process the same piece of data for a single IP multiple 
times.  The structure of the IP Activity table is shown in Table 4.1 below. 
 
IP1-IP4 These four fields hold the four octets of an IP address that the system 
is tracking.  Splitting an IP address up into octet sections also allows 
for searching based on the whole IP and also different domain 
segments.  The four IP address fields make up the primary key for this 
table. 
First 
Activity 
This field stores the timestamp of the first activity recorded for this IP.  
This, in combination with the Last Activity field allows the tracking of 
the activity lifespan of an IP 
Last 
Activity 
This field stores the timestamp of the latest activity recorded for this 
IP. 
Mail Count The count of emails (spam and non-spam) received from this IP 
Scan Count The count of port scans (network precursor activity) received from this 
IP 
Suspicion This field stores the current suspicion value of this IP.  Once this value 
passes a certain threshold (determined by Wald’s Sequential 
Hypothesis Testing), it is added to the Benign IP or Banned IP table. 
First Log 
Byte 
This field stores the byte location of the first activity recorded for this 
IP 
Last Log 
Byte 
This field stores the byte location of the last activity recorded for this 
IP. 
Table 4.1: IP Activity table description 
IP Suspicion 
For every instance of network activity observed for a particular IP address, the 
suspicion value of the IP is changed.  Malicious activity (such as a portscan or an 
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incoming spam message) increases an IP’s suspicion level, while non-malicious 
activity (such as legitimate email) decreases it.  If the IP address exceeds either of 
two predefined threshold values, it is classified malicious or benign, depending on 
which threshold was exceeded.  If the IP address has been classified as benign, it is 
added to the Benign IP table in the database.  This table records IP addresses that 
have been recognised as providing sufficient evidence that they are not malicious, 
allowing their mail to access the network without further interference by the system.  
If an email is received from an IP address listed in the Benign IP table, it is let 
through and not scrutinised any further.  Precursor activity is not recorded for IP 
addresses in the Benign IP table.  Once the IP is removed from the table, it is again 
subject to scrutiny by the system.  The inclusion of the Benign IP table allows the 
system to operate with more efficiency, as IP addresses that send large amounts of 
legitimate mail and exhibit no malicious activity or only a minimal amount will be 
quickly added to the table, allowing the system to focus on more threatening IP 
addresses. 
Taking Action 
In a normal network environment, once an IP address is classified as malicious, the 
system would then communicate this information to all gateways in the network.  
Rules would then be added to each gateway’s firewall to deny traffic from the 
malicious address entry to the network.  As the system developed for this thesis acts 
in a simulated environment, the actual adding of rules to network gateways can not 
occur.  Instead, this step is simulated by adding data to the Banned IP table.  The 
system checks the IP address of incoming network activity and if the same address is 
listed in the Banned table then that packet would have been blocked from entering 
the network.  For research purposes, the Phase 2 system records details of these 
packets to another database table, the Blocked table.  This simulates the blocking of 
messages and also allows empirical data to be gathered about the amount of emails 
blocked by the system and the IP addresses they came from.  It must be noted that in 
a real world system these packets would have never even entered the network.  Table 
4.2 (below) shows a description of the structure of the Banned IP and Benign IP 
tables. 
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IP1-IP4 These four fields hold the four octets of an IP address that the system 
is banned or rated as benign.  Splitting an IP address up into octet 
sections also allows for searching based on the whole IP and also 
different domain segments.  The four IP address fields make up the 
primary key for this table. 
Start This field records the time that this particular IP address was added to 
the Banned IP or Benign IP tables 
End This field records the time that this particular IP address is due to be 
removed from this table. 
Suspicion This field records the IP’s suspicion value at the time of being added to 
the Banned IP or Benign IP table. 
Table 4.2: Banned IP/Benign IP table description 
 
As the system is intended to run in real-time, ensuring efficiency is essential.  Every 
extra database entry adds a small amount of seek time per database query.  Also, 
every firewall rule added at the gateways increases the amount of time needed to 
filter every packet attempting to access the network.  Therefore, the key to keeping 
the system running efficiently is to remove database entries and firewall rules that are 
no longer needed.  In the Phase 2 system, this was accomplished through the use of 
limited ban lengths and the History table.  When an IP address exceeds one of the 
two suspicion thresholds and is classified either benign or malicious, a variable in the 
system determines how long a given IP address will be banned from the network or 
classified as benign.  Once this time limit has been reached, the IP has its network 
ban lifted or its benign status revoked.  In reality, the removal of a ban would involve 
sending messages to all gateways in the network to remove the rule relating to 
packets from the previously banned address.  To simulate this, the Phase 2 system 
removes the entry from either the Benign IP or Banned IP tables and adds it to the 
History table.  The History table keeps track of IP addresses that have been either 
banned from the network or rated as benign.  This allows statistics to be collected 
about the amount of times IP addresses have been banned from the network or rated 
as benign.   
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Setting a limit on the amount of time an address will be rated malicious or benign 
also deals with the possibility of a benign IP becoming more malicious over time or a 
malicious IP reforming and becoming benign.  Considering this possibility is very 
important, as something as simple as an ISP changing its email policies (e.g. closing 
open relays) could turn a domain known for sending spam into a domain from which 
little spam comes.  This gives the system the flexibility to dynamically determine if 
an IP is malicious or benign, as opposed to systems such as blacklists that produce a 
single static verdict.  Table 4.3 details the structure of the History table. 
 
IP1-IP4 These four fields hold the four octets of an IP address that have 
previously been banned from the system or rated benign.  Splitting an 
IP address up into octet sections also allows for searching based on the 
whole IP and also different domain segments.  The four IP address 
fields make up the primary key for this table. 
Banned 
Count 
This field stores a count of the number of times this IP has been 
banned from the network. 
Benign 
Count 
This field stores a count of the number of times this IP has been rated 
as benign by the system. 
Total 
Suspicion 
This field stores the total suspicion value of the IP address. 
Last 
Activity 
This field stores the last time a given IP entry was added to the table. 
Table 4.3: History table description 
 
To ensure correctness of the both the Phase 1 and Phase 2 systems, they were tested 
with synthesized logs made up of known quantities of legitimate email, spam email 
and precursor activity.  The results from these tests were hand checked to ensure 
proper output was generated.  The source code to the Phase 1 and Phase 2 systems, 
as well as the scripts to create the aforementioned database tables can be found on 
the Appendix CD accompanying this thesis.  
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4.4 Testing 
Testing for both the Phase 1 and Phase 2 system was carried out on live audit log 
data.  The audit logs that have been provided for this research project come from a 
network covering an almost complete class C IP domain.  This network is similar in 
size to a typical small hosting provider or business in Australia.  Internally, the 
network is comprised of multiple gateways connected to multiple mail servers. 
 
Four audit logs from the above system were used as the primary sources of data for 
this research.  These audit logs contain syslog entries amalgamated with entries from 
the mail servers.  Each of these audit log files are comprised of contributions from 
the Sendmail mail transfer agent, the PortSentry intrusion detection system and the 
Linux kernel firewall (running iptables4).  Details about the types of information 
reported by these sources can be found in Section 2.6.1 and Section 2.6.2.  The first 
audit log file encompasses a 21 day period from the 1st to the 21st of July 2004.  The 
second audit log covers a 31 day period between the 1st and 31st of August 2004.  
The third log used in this research covers a 26 day period between the 1st and 26th of 
July 2005 and the forth log contains activity recorded between the 1st and 31st of 
August 2005.  Table 4.4 shows the differences between the various audit log files 
used for this research. 
 
 Month Year File Size Length Total Lines Sendmail 
Lines 
Log 1 July 2004 296 MB 21 Days 2203331 141663 
Log 2 August 2004 210 MB 31 Days 1559537 110201 
Log 3 July 2005 94 MB 26 Days 740761 189605 
Log 4 August 2005 300 MB 31 Days 2198704 363260 
Table 4.4: Audit log file statistics 
4.4.1 Phase 1 Testing 
The first sets of results represent a validation of MacLeavy’s previous work and used 
Logs 1 and 2.  Log 1 and Log 2 are the exact files that were used by MacLeavy when 
gathering his results.  The major issue that was identified when recording results 
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from Phase 1 testing was that of spam classification.  The Sendmail entries in the log 
file contained only a small amount of information about each received mail message.  
It was decided that three fields of the Sendmail entry were to be used to determine 
spam; from, msgid, and relay.  Based on the information listed in each of these fields, 
a decision was made as to whether a particular message was spam.  If a message had 
no from address, for example, it most likely was spam, as legitimate email programs 
generally include this information when an email is sent.  Also, the domain 
information included in the from address (if it contains any data at all) was checked 
against the domain listed in the msgid and relay fields; inconsistent domain 
information can be an indicator that an email is spam, although it must be noted that 
this is not always the case.  In order to take this into account, msgid and relay 
information was only examined if the from address looked suspicious or contained 
no information. 
4.4.2 Phase 2 Testing 
The results recorded for the Phase 2 system were obtained from testing on newer 
audit log files, namely Logs 3 and 4.  These log filed were chosen primarily because 
they show network activity from 2005, as opposed to Log 1 and Log 2.  It was 
decided that the most recent logs would provide a better picture of current network 
activity than logs that are greater than one year old.  It was originally intended that 
the system would be tested on live spam logs from the time period covered by Log 3 
and Log 4.  Unfortunately, due to the way the logging for the spam filter that 
provided logs for this research was configured, it was extremely difficult to extract 
the correct IP address of emails that the spam filter had flagged as spam.  Instead, 
simulated spam filter logs were created from mail server logs.  As it is widely 
recognised that emails sent with no information in the from field have a very high 
probability of being spam, emails with no information in the from field were deemed 
to be spam and added to the simulated spam log.  In essence, this simulated spam log 
represents the most basic of all spam filters that could be installed on a mail server.  
While not ideal in a pure spam identification sense, this simulated log should still 
provide sufficient evidence as to whether the system is feasible.   
 
The different values of the suspicion and threshold variables can be used by an 
administrator to represent a network’s email policy.  The relationship between the 
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spam and other email values represents the proportion of traffic required for a 
particular IP address to be added as benign or banned from the network.  The 
thresholds can also be modified according to policy, as they represent the ‘amount of 
evidence’ the system requires in order to classify an IP.  Set higher and the system 
can be more assured that it knows an IP’s real intentions, at the cost of letting more 
spam through initially.  Conversely, setting either threshold lower decreases the 
overall accuracy of the system in order to respond to a potential spam attack more 
quickly. 
 
Spam Value Other Email Port Scan Ban Threshold Benign 
Threshold 
Ban / Benign 
Length 
+4 -2 +1 10 -10 24 hours 
Table 4.5: System variables 
The values used for Sequential Hypothesis testing in this research are given in Table 
4.5.  These variables all have an effect on system operation.  The spam, other email 
and port scan values all determine how effective the system will be in both 
identifying spammer IP addresses that should be banned from the network and also 
identifying benign IP addresses that should be allowed access.  The spam value was 
set as contributing +4 to an IP’s suspicion, on the basis that an IP should be banned 
once it sends three spam messages, with up to a single legitimate mail accompanying 
these.  The port scan value is set as contributing +1 to an IP’s suspicion value on the 
basis that receiving ten precursors, one spam and six precursors or two spams and 
two precursors from a spammer IP should result in a system ban.  Conversely, the 
other email value was set as contributing -2 to the IP address’s suspicion value.  This 
was set as a lower value mostly because the system classifies all emails that are not 
expressly flagged as spam by the spam filter as legitimate.  Due to the fact that this 
system had to be tested on synthetic spam logs representing the most rudimentary 
spam filter, it is extremely likely that many other emails shown in the logs are also 
spam.  The lower value for the other mail variable is an attempt to offset the issue 
that there would be a much higher amount of false negatives produced by the system 
as a result of the inaccurate spam identification method used.  This way, an IP 
address needs to send the system at least five emails that are not flagged as spam 
before being counted as benign.  A system with a more accurate spam detection 
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method would benefit from having this value set closer to the negative of the spam 
email value, in this case -4 might prove to be a better value. 
 
The length of time that an IP is classified benign or banned from the network has 
been set at a static 24 hour time period.  This was used mainly because it is a 
common default set by system administrators who use intrusion detection systems 
(Manderson 2005).  Also, this value sets a safeguard for the potential banning of 
legitimate email sources as the maximum amount of time an IP address can be 
banned from the network is this 24 hour time period.  
 
The Phase 2 system was run multiple times to extract results for this research.  The 
first run for each log file had no restrictions placed on how far it looked back in the 
audit log.  Also, the system variables were set such that IP addresses could never be 
classified as malicious or benign.  These settings allowed statistics to be collected 
from the system running at maximum accuracy, and provided a baseline processing 
time that other system modifications could be compared against.  The system was 
then run with IP classification activated at various log look back lengths, from as 
long as a full month to as little as a single day.  These tests provided the data that is 
presented and analysed in the Results and Discussion section.
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5 Results and Discussion 
The following section examines the results obtained from tests performed on both the 
Phase 1 and Phase 2 systems.  The audit log files used to perform the tests have been 
provided by Kevin Manderson from his Security Consulting Business.  The details of 
the Phase 1 and 2 systems, as well as the audit logs used can be found in the 
Methodology chapter of this thesis (Section 4). 
5.1 Phase 1 Results 
In contrast to the eight days of server processing needed to extract results from the 
MacLeavy system, the revised Phase 1 system took just nine minutes and eight 
seconds to process the entirety of Log 1 and only five minutes and five seconds to 
process the entirety of Log 2.  This significant increase in run time efficiency can be 
attributed to a variety of factors.  The first and most significant factor was that the 
searching algorithm used was more efficient.  While the MacLeavy system had to 
iterate through the audit log file once for each mail encountered, the Phase 1 system 
only required a single pass through the log file in order to store activity data into the 
hash table.  This did result in higher memory utilisation, but still shows that real-time 
operation of a similar system is more feasible than the MacLeavy results suggest.  
Also, it must be noted that the results recorded for the Phase 1 system were obtained 
using an 800 MHz Pentium 3 with 512 MB of memory, a decidedly inferior system 
to the server that the MacLeavy system ran on.  This further highlights the Phase 1 
system’s increased efficiency. 
 
Table 5.1 (over page) shows some statistics that were collected in the course of 
examining the MacLeavy results.  In Log 1, 123 email messages from 98 distinct IP 
addresses were recorded as having precursor activity.  An average of 6.98 precursor 
scans were received per message that exhibited precursor activity.  Additionally, the 
results recorded for Log 2 show 223 distinct IP addresses sending a total of 312 
email messages with precursors, with the average precursor scans per received email 
as 10.29.  This clearly shows that precursor activity for email messages was 
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observed, although the proportion of messages recorded with precursor activity was 
extremely small when compared to the overall count of mail in the time period 
covered by the audit log.  Only 0.09% of emails from Log 1 contained any network 
precursor activity at all and Log 2, although offering a significant precursor increase 
over Log 1, still only reports precursors for 0.28% of all emails.  It needs to be noted 
that these figures represent statistics for precursors for all email messages, not just 
spam.  As Logs 1 and 2 contained approximately 80% spam compared to regular 
email (Manderson 2005), the proportions presented by this initial investigation were 
deemed sufficient enough for the determination to be made that port scan precursor 
detection would not be useful to the real-time (Phase 2) system. 
 
  Log 1 Log 2 
Total mail count 141663 110201 
Mail with precursors 123 312 
Precursor count 858 3211 
Average number of precursors for mail with 
precursors 6.98 10.29 
Average number of precursors for all mail 0.006 0.029 
Distinct IPs with precursor activity 98 223 
Table 5.1: Phase 1 precursor statistics 
The major ports that were scanned as precursors to the sending of mail, as shown in 
Table 5.2 (over page), were 135, 139, 1433, 25 and 0.  TCP port 135 is officially 
used for Microsoft Remote Procedure Call (also known as Distributed COM Service 
Control Manager), while port 139 is officially used for the NetBIOS Session Service 
(Seifried 2003).  These services are both used for SMB file and print sharing, but 
more recently TCP ports 153 and 139 have received attention as ports exploited by 
worms specifically targeting Microsoft Windows users, such as the W32/Blaster 
worm (Dougherty et al. 2003).  Port 1433 is reserved for use by the Microsoft SQL 
server but is also targeted for exploitation by another Internet worm known as Spida, 
SQLSnake or Digispid (Dougherty and Householder 2002).  The release of these 
worms predates the period of time covered by Logs 1 and 2 and thus could be 
responsible for scan activity recorded over this time period. 
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 Number of scans per distinct port 
Port Number Log 1 Log 2 
0 82 56 
25 157 0 
135 398 263 
139 215 2845 
1433 6 47 
Table 5.2: Phase 1 precursor ports 
Other precursors appear on TCP ports 25 and 0.  Port 25 is used for SMTP 
connections (i.e. the transfer of email messages) so activity on this port could 
represent a remote entity scanning to see if a mail server is operating.  Port 0 is listed 
as a reserved port by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority5, meaning that no 
activity should appear on this port.  Even though it is reserved, some systems treat a 
port 0 connection attempt as a request for connection on the lowest free TCP port.  
Additionally, due to the differing responses generated by various operating systems 
when a port 0 connection is requested, port 0 scanning can also be used to determine 
the OS running on a target machine (Jones 2003).  This observed activity on port 0 
could represent an automated mailer testing to see if a computer is located at the 
target IP address, then sending spam to that address if the target is confirmed. 
 
Another observed pattern was that for mail that appeared after precursor attacks 
consistent with worm activity (ports 135, 139 and 1433), the message usually arrived 
a number of days after the last precursor activity.  Conversely, mail that appeared 
after port 0 and 25 activity usually arrived within a number of seconds. 
 
From the above results, it could be inferred that precursor activity on the commonly 
exploited ports is indicative of traffic arriving from zombie machines compromised 
by the worms listed earlier.  The initial (precursor) activity from these hosts could 
represent the worm attempting to propagate itself on to other machines, while the 
subsequent spam messages result from the compromised machines being utilised to 
send spam.  As the precursor activity observed on ports 0 and 25 occurred much 
closer to the actual arrival of spam messages, this activity could indicate the use of a 
bulk mailer program that scans for active IP addresses to propagate spam to. 
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If the activity on ports 135, 159 and 1433 does indeed represent precursor activity 
from a computer compromised by a worm, audit log based precursor detection could 
be a very useful way in which to detect the IP addresses of zombie machines.  A list 
of these zombie computers could be maintained and network gateways could block 
all activity from these machines for a period of time, say 24 hours.  These lists could 
also possibly be made public so other network administrators could also be informed 
of potential zombie addresses.  This could be an interesting avenue for future 
investigation. 
 
Despite the findings above, the fact that precursor activity was only observed in a 
small number of all emails indicates that detecting actual spam based on precursor 
activity alone will most likely offer only a minute improvement on current systems, 
at a significant increase in computing power needed to run the system.  For the real-
time system to be viable, an alternate method of determining from whom spam is 
likely to arrive needs to be developed. 
5.2 Phase 2 Results 
The Phase 2 system is designed to test whether precursor detection at the gateway is 
a viable spam protection technique.  To answer this, two areas need to be examined: 
timeliness and effectiveness.  It needs to be determined if the Phase 2 system can 
operate fast enough to be viable as a real-time system.  It also needs to be determined 
if the system will block enough spam messages to warrant the drain it places on 
gateway resources.  If the system only manages to block a small proportion of spam 
messages, it would make more sense to let the mail server filter every message (as it 
currently does) and not increase the load on the gateways unnecessarily.  The amount 
of time that the system looks back in the amalgamated audit log influences the 
timeliness of the system, as more processing is required every time the system 
searches for precursor activity for a particular IP address.  The effectiveness of the 
system is also influenced by the amount of time used in precursor searching, as the 
further back an audit log is searched, the more accurate the detection will be.  
Therefore, it is important to determine a value representing the amount of time in 
which to search back through the audit log which offers a fast operating time 
combined with accurate precursor detection.  If this amount of time is too little, 
Catching Spam Before It Arrives  Results and Discussion 
  44 
precursors could be missed while if the time is too high, the system may be late in 
informing other gateways to block incoming spam, lowering blocking effectiveness. 
5.2.1 Spam as a Precursor 
Due to the low percentage of network activity observed as spam precursors in the 
results from Phase 1 (see Section 5.1), an alternative method was sought to determine 
if spam is likely to be received by the network.  The solution implemented in the 
Phase 2 system was to use spam messages themselves as an indicator that more spam 
is likely to arrive from an IP.  This allows the system to identify IP addresses that are 
sending multiple spam messages to different addresses within the network or sending 
multiple spam messages to the same address.  A criticism of this approach could be 
that it requires the network to receive multiple spam messages before action is taken.  
While this is true and the obvious solution could be to just ban a spammer’s IP 
address as soon as the first spam is flagged by the mail server’s spam filter, it is 
believed that the method implemented provides the end user with greater protection 
from false positives.  As spam filtering at the network wide level generally involves 
no user input at all, it is important to do as much as possible to prevent legitimate 
email from being marked as spam and blocked from the network. 
 
Concentrating on spam as precursor activity as well as monitoring other network 
precursors proved appropriate, as only three network precursors were recorded out of 
6977 spam messages analysed from Log 3.  Log 4 only fared marginally better, with 
twelve precursors recorded out of the 4420 spam messages analysed.  With numbers 
this low, it cannot be conclusively stated that this activity represents specific 
precursor activity to the sending of spam.   
5.2.2 Time Span of IP Activity 
In order to determine how far to look back in the system audit logs, the amount of 
time that IP addresses are usually active needs to be examined.  Complete activity 
times were calculated for every unique IP that sent email.  This was found by 
calculating the difference between the time of latest activity and the time of first 
activity for each IP.  These times were then grouped together in discreet day periods, 
from less than one day to between 15 and 31 days.  For example, IPs with an activity 
time span of less than a single day were grouped together and IPs with an activity 
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time span of between one and three days were grouped together.  This process was 
completed until each IP was contained within one of these groups.  The pie charts in 
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 below show the relative proportions of IP activity time 
over the two log files, calculated from information contained in the firstactivity and 
lastactivity fields of the IP Activity database table. 
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Figure 5.1: Log 3 IP activity time span (July-05) 
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Figure 5.2: Log 4 IP activity time span (Aug-05) 
 
 What is immediately apparent is that an overwhelming majority of the IP addresses 
recorded had a total activity time span of less than a single day.  Furthermore, over 
90% of IPs observed have an activity time span of less than a week.  Figure 5.3 
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shows the proportion of IPs that would have their complete activity profile observed 
for each amount of days looked back. 
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Figure 5.3: Amount of IP activity observed for different look back amounts 
 
As can be seen in the above graph, looking back 5 days means the system will 
observe the full activity time spans of over 90% of all active IP addresses in the log 
file, while looking back 12 days allows the system to fully observe over 95% of all 
active IPs.  Furthermore, looking back more than 12 to 14 days yields only minimal 
percentage increases for each extra look-back day.  This suggests that the amount of 
time to look back should definitely be set at a period of less than two weeks, as 
looking back any extra amount of time makes the system increasingly inefficient for 
only small increases in accuracy. 
5.2.3 Time Cost of Looking Back 
Another factor that plays a part in the determination of how far should be looked 
back in the logs is the amount of time it takes for the system to process each new 
spam message.  If this time is too large, the system will not be able to act in time to 
stop the arrival of subsequent spam.  For every entry in the simulated spam log, the 
time the system took to process this entry was recorded.  The results for this test on 
Log 4 (the more complete of the two logs used for Phase 2 testing) are showed in 
Figure 5.4 (over page). 
Catching Spam Before It Arrives  Results and Discussion 
  47 
Log Traversal Times (Aug-05)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Iteration Number
Ti
m
e 
(se
co
n
ds
)
 
Figure 5.4: Look back times for spam messages in Log 4 (Aug-05) 
 
In this test, the amount of time the system looks back in the log file was unrestricted.  
As the above iteration times were collected from a static single month log file, the 
amount of log look back time is dependant on the time of activity.    For example, a 
spam message that arrived on the 2nd of August only had two days for the system to 
look back, whereas a spam message that arrived on the 28th of August still required 
the system to search from the start of the log and therefore had to search for 28 log 
days.  As the iterations were ordered by date and time of arrival, the earlier iterations 
represent activity from earlier in August whereas the latter iterations represent 
activity from later in the month.   
 
It can be seen that the amount of time that the system takes to complete an iteration 
rises in a generally linear fashion as the amount of time that is looked back in the log 
increases.  The plateau sections, particularly between iterations 1000 and 1500 are 
caused by a greater density of spam activity condensed within a particular time 
period, whereas the sections with a greater than normal gradient (for example, 
between iterations 4000 and 4500) represent a period of time with less spam activity 
than normal.  The iterations shown on the graph that take less than the normal 
amount of time represent extra efficiency built in to the system.  This efficiency is 
mostly due to the fact that the system does not have to start at the beginning of the 
log file when it encounters an IP address that it has seen before (see Section 4.3.1).  
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The large proportion of iterations that took less time to complete indicates that the 
system is operating at a high level of efficiency.    
 
The occasional iterations with a time larger than normal (one at approximately 
iteration 900, one at approximately iteration 1950 and one at approximately iteration 
4200) represent times when the system encountered a new benign IP.  As the activity 
for an IP address is not examined until a spam message from that IP is received,  
The first time a spam message is received from an IP with a large amount of 
legitimate email activity causes the system to examine all the activity for that IP, 
resulting in a large amount of time to process that iteration.  These iterations 
represent the only times where system timeliness is not defined by the amount of 
time it takes to look back in the audit log.  These situations are extremely rare 
though, with only three recorded out of the 4420 entries in the simulated spam log.  
Also, this only happens once for each new benign IP encountered, as the IP will be 
added to the Benign IP table once the initial iteration completes. 
5.2.4 Total System Run-Time 
The final measure of the timeliness of the system is to see how long it takes to fully 
process an entire audit log file.  Theoretically, as long as the system finishes 
processing an audit log in less time than the time period covered by the log file, it 
can be said to be running in real-time.  This being the case, it is still important to 
lower the running time as much as possible in order to increase the scalability of the 
system.  Figure 5.5 below shows the total running time of the system for various log 
look back lengths. 
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Figure 5.5: Total system run times 
The first set of columns in the chart represents a system run with unlimited (full 
month) log look back and no banning (or benign classification) of IP addresses.  This 
provides a base time for system operation that can be used when measuring the 
efficiency gains of banning of different log look back amounts.  The next group 
represents the same look back amount, but with banning and benign monitoring 
activated.  This lowered that actual amount of spam messages that the system had to 
process, but surprisingly did not lower the system run time significantly.  This is 
most likely due to the way the simulated system still had to process messages from 
blocked IP addresses (see Section 4.3.1).  It is expected that running the system in a 
real environment (as opposed to a simulated one) would show greater gains with IP 
banning activated.  The difference in operation time between Log 3 and Log 4 is due 
to the fact that Log 3 covers a shorter time period (26 days) than Log 4 and that, due 
to various logging features being disabled by the administrator, has a lower activity 
density (see Section 4.4 for respective log file sizes).  Despite this, both audit logs 
show a similar trend in the amount of efficiency gained by increasingly smaller log 
look back amounts. 
 
Looking back 14 days instead of the whole month reduces the total running time by 
approximately 20%, while looking back a week only takes approximately 50% of the 
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run time of the full look back system.  The smaller look back values further increased 
system efficiency, as the three day look back took only approximately 25% of the 
full run time while the single day look back system required only 20 minutes (5.86% 
of the original system run time) to process a full month of audit log activity.  This 
shows that the system is definitely efficient enough to operate in real-time, with 
significant scope for handling larger networks with audit logs of greater density. 
 
Using these time figures, it can be calculated that the single day look back system 
took on average 0.28 seconds to process a single spam message from Log 4. The 
three day system took 1.09 seconds to process a single spam message, while the 
seven day system took 2.42 seconds, the 14 day system took 3.76 seconds and the 
month long look back system took 4.41 seconds on average to process a single spam 
message.   
5.2.5 System Effectiveness 
Another factor to be examined in order to determine how far to look back in the audit 
log is the impact that this look back time has on system effectiveness.  Figure 5.6 
below shows how many IP addresses were classified malicious (and subsequently 
banned) or benign. 
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Figure 5.6: IPs banned / benign in Log 4 (Aug-05) 
The graph above shows that the number of IP addresses classified as benign 
decreases as the number of days looked back in the audit log decreases.  There is an 
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especially large decrease in IPs classified benign between the 3 day log look back 
and the single day log look back systems.  This indicates that a significant proportion 
(approximately 42%) of IP addresses that have been rated as benign by the system 
have a total activity time span of greater than a single day, while 16.7% of IP 
addresses classified as benign have a total activity time span of greater than three 
days. 
 
In comparison with the results of benign table additions, the number of IP addresses 
classified as malicious and subsequently banned from the network remain steady 
throughout all look back lengths tested, with the number actually rising slightly at a 
look back amount of one day.  This indicates that almost all of the IP addresses that 
are classified as spam by the system have an activity time span of less than a day, as 
the system does not lose any banning accuracy by looking back shorter amounts.  
The slight rise in IP addresses banned for look back amounts of three and seven days 
is probably due a small amount of IPs that were classified as benign in the three day 
and above look back systems being now classified as malicious with only a single 
day of log look back.  This shows that malicious IPs generally send all of their spam 
in a small period of time (less than a day) and then disappear from the network, 
whereas benign IPs keep in contact with the network for longer periods of time (as 
would be expected).  This is essentially due to the one-way nature of spam; a 
spammer sends out a large volume of messages in the hope of some replies.  
Legitimate emails, on the other hand generally lead to replies back and forth, leading 
to a longer period of activity recorded for the legitimate sender’s IP.  Figure 5.7 (over 
page) shows the actual amount of email messages blocked (if the IP has been 
banned) or ignored (if the IP is benign) by the system for the same time period. 
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Figure 5.7: Number of emails blocked / ignored from Log 4 (Aug-05) 
The above figure shows that the number of packets ignored by the system drops 
between the three day look back and one day look back systems.  This further 
supports the conclusion that only looking back a single day in the audit logs leads to 
less accuracy in the detection of benign IPs.  The amount of emails blocked by the 
system for different log look back times also does not change significantly, 
supporting the conclusion that the majority of spammers operate within a time period 
of less than 24 hours.  The number of emails ignored by the system drops off 
between the three day and single day look back systems, partially supporting the 
information shown in Figure 5.6.  Interestingly, the number of emails ignored does 
not reduce significantly between the unlimited look back run and the three day run.  
This suggests that a high percentage of benign IP addresses are active for a time 
period of between one and three days, as even though more IPs were classified as 
benign with a longer log look back, the amount of actual emails ignored only reduces 
slightly between an unlimited look back value and a three day look back value. 
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Log Look Back Time 
  Unlimited 14 Days 7 Days 3 Days 1 Day 
Total Simulated Spam 4420 4420 4420 4420 4420 
Total Emails Blocked 1170 1170 1171 1172 1166 
Block % 26.47% 26.47% 26.49% 26.52% 26.38% 
Difference From Unlimited NA 0 1 2 4 
% Difference From 
Unlimited NA 0.00% 0.09% 0.17% 0.34% 
Number of Distinct Bans 189 188 188 188 192 
Total Emails Ignored 310 306 295 282 200 
Ignore Percentage 7.01% 6.92% 6.67% 6.38% 4.52% 
Difference From Unlimited NA 4 15 28 110 
% Difference From 
Unlimited NA 1.29% 4.84% 9.03% 35.48% 
Distinct Benign 
Classifications 257 236 249 214 148 
Table 5.3: Log 4 (Aug-05) blocked / ignored statistics 
 
Table 5.3 shows the proportion of spam messages that were blocked by the system 
with the variables set as defined in Table 4.5.  It can be seen that the system, if 
running on a real network, would have blocked over 25% of the spam from the 
simulated spam log from entering the network at all.  This could represent a 
significant increase in the running efficiency of the network’s mail servers as well as 
a reduction in overall internal network traffic.  Overall, the unlimited look-back 
system blocked 1170 spam messages from 189 distinct bans, representing an average 
of 16 spam messages received per ban.  It must be remembered that these 
percentages come from analysis of a simulated spam log, with all emails not flagged 
as spam by this simulated log classified as legitimate.  Any real-world spam 
detection technology would detect more spam than the amount contained within the 
simulated log and the system should then increase in detection (and therefore 
blocking) accuracy.  Another interesting observation that can be made from this table 
is that 35.48% less benign emails are ignored by the system with a single day log 
look back; while only 9.03% of benign emails are missed in the three day look back 
system.  This further reinforces the conclusion that a significant proportion of benign 
activity occurs in a time period of between one and three days, thought the highest 
proportion of benign activity (64.52%) still occurs within a single day. 
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5.2.6 Time Between IP Ban and Subsequent Spam 
A major factor that determines the viability of the system is whether it can detect and 
respond to an incoming spam attack in time to stop subsequent spam from the IP 
entering the network.  To test this, 10% of IP addresses were randomly selected from 
the list of IPs banned from the network and subjected to further investigation.  The 
amount of time between when each IP was banned and when the next email arrived 
from that IP was recorded, as well as the time details for the subsequent two emails 
for the same IP.  Figure 5.8 shows the distribution of arrival times for the first 
message received after an IP has been banned, while Figure 5.9 shows the 
distribution of arrival times for the second and third messages received by the same 
IPs after they have been banned. 
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Figure 5.8: Arrival times for first spam after an IP is banned 
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Figure 5.9: Arrival times for the second and third spam messages 
 
Figure 5.8 shows that 25% of the IPs investigated sent spam within one second of 
being banned from the network and with a further 10% sent subsequent spam within 
five seconds of being banned.  This shows that if the system can classify an IP as a 
spammer and block it from the network within five seconds (as this is greater than 
the average time it took a full month look back system to process a single spam 
message), it is be able to block the approximately 65% of spammer IPs completely, 
while 35% will be able to propagate at least one more spam message to the network 
before it is blocked.  Furthermore, only 26% of the second and third messages send 
by banned spammers arrives at the network within five seconds.  As each spammer 
sends an average of 16 mails per ban (as mentioned above), the amount of spam let 
through by the system represents only a small proportion of the amount of spam it 
would catch. 
 
If the system can classify an IP as a spammer and block it from the network within 
two seconds, only 30% of IPs would be able to get a subsequent spam message 
through before being blocked. Also, only 17% of spammers would be able to 
propagate a second or third message before being blocked.  As the three day look 
back system took just over a second on average (see Section 5.2.4) to process an 
incoming spam, it seems that this is a reasonable compromise between accuracy of 
spam determination and effectiveness of the system.  
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5.2.7 Other Findings 
Repeat Offenders 
Another factor that can influence the effectiveness of the system is the amount of 
times an IP is banned from the network or classified as benign.  Table 5.4 and Table 
5.5 show how many times IPs were added to the banned and benign tables. 
 
Number of times banned Distinct IPs 
1 122 
2 18 
3 3 
4 2 
5 1 
6 0 
7 0 
8 0 
9 1 
Table 5.4: Log 4 (Aug-05) ban frequency 
 
Number of times benign Distinct IPs 
1 29 
2 6 
3 4 
4 4 
5 3 
6 0 
7 0 
8 1 
9 0 
10 1 
11 0 
12 2 
13 2 
14 3 
15 3 
16 1 
Table 5.5: Log 4 (Aug-05) benign frequency 
 
It can be seen that the majority (82.99%) of IP address that are banned from the 
network are only banned once, suggesting that a large amount of spammers are 
attacking the network only a single time.  Benign IPs are much more likely to be 
classified as benign more than once, with just over half (50.85%) of the IPs classified 
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by the system as benign added to the benign table multiple times.  This suggests that 
IPs that are classified as benign should perhaps be added to the benign table for a 
longer period of time.  A potential avenue for future work would be to ban IP 
addresses for longer periods (e.g. greater than 24 hours) every successive time they 
are banned from the network. Implementing an increasing ban length based on ban 
count could potentially lower the effect serial spammers have on the network, as 
every time they attack the network they incur a longer ban.  A similar 
implementation could also be applied to benign IPs, with the length of time they stay 
on the benign table set longer for successive benign classifications. 
 
The results detailed above indicate that a system that looks three days back in the 
amalgamated audit logs offers the best compromise between timeliness, accuracy and 
the effectiveness of the system.  Even though looking back over a whole month’s 
worth of activity provided the system with the greatest accuracy, a look back time 
period of three days means the system would see the full activity spectrum of 
approximately 90% of all IPs, while operating at a significantly greater level of 
efficiency.  By looking back for a time period of greater than 24 hours, the system is 
still able to retain full banning and blocking capabilities whilst maintaining good 
accuracy for benign IPs.  Also, if the network administrator was prepared to accept 
lower accuracy when detection benign IPs or was able to implement a different 
method of benign IP tracking, a log look back time of 24 hours could be used. 
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6 Conclusions and Future Work 
The research presented in this thesis focused on developing techniques to identify 
and catch spam at the network gateway.  The ultimate aim of the project was to 
reduce the strain caused by spam on the network’s internal infrastructure, in 
particular the mail servers as they no longer have to process as many spam messages.  
Lowering the load on the network’s mail servers leaves them with more time to 
perform their primary duty of forwarding legitimate emails to their intended 
recipients.  
 
The initial goal of this study was to validate the Honours work started by MacLeavy 
in 2004.  Specifically, it needed to be determined if the detection of spam precursors 
could be used to create a system running in real-time that could identify the 
imminent arrival of spam and block it at the network gateway.   Analysis of gateway 
audit log files identified potential spam precursor activity, but unfortunately this 
activity was found in such low proportions that it was deemed unsuitable for use in a 
real-time spam prevention system.   
 
With network precursor detection deemed unsuitable, it was then proposed that spam 
messages themselves could be used as precursors, allowing the system to identify the 
current IP addresses of spammers and block them from accessing the network.  In 
order to provide protection against legitimate emails being blocked by the system, a 
system of IP suspicion was implemented, with IP addresses being classified as 
malicious or benign based on the collection of supporting evidence. 
 
Analysis of the timeliness of the system led to the conclusion that it executed with 
sufficient efficiency to make real-time operation viable.  The speed of the system is 
directly linked to the amount of time that is looked back in the audit logs when 
searching for precursor spam activity.  This amount of time also influences the 
effectiveness of the system, as accuracy is lowered when the log look back amount is 
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too small.  It was determined that a look back amount of three days provided a good 
balance between system timeliness and effectiveness. 
 
6.1 Future Work 
The research detailed in this thesis has shown the viability of a spam prevention 
system at the network gateway, providing multiple avenues into further research 
within the area of spam protection using intrusion detection system techniques.  The 
first area that needs to be investigated is to test the system using real spam filter log 
files instead of the simulated files used in this thesis.  This would provide a true 
validation of the usefulness of the system and more definite statistics could be 
produced regarding the system’s accuracy and effectiveness.  An extension to this 
would be to run the system live upon a network with multiple gateways and mail 
servers.  This would provide the most accurate form of validation, as the system’s 
effect on overall network performance could be measured and compared to the gains 
in performance brought by the extra spam protection. 
 
The amount of time that the system looks back in audit logs to gather evidence 
against IP addresses could be determined dynamically instead of being set at a static 
value.  Log look back could increase in periods of lower network activity, as the 
system can afford to spend more processing power to increase the accuracy of IP 
classification.  When network activity is higher than normal, the system could reduce 
the look back length to ensure network operation speed is not negatively affected 
while still maintaining some form of spam protection. 
 
Another avenue for further work is the validation of the different suspicion and 
threshold values of the system.  These values were chosen arbitrarily, based in part 
on the fact that simulated spam log files were used in this research.  These values 
could be tested further and either validated as appropriate or alternative values could 
be found.  Depending on the spam filter used, these values could be dynamically 
assigned based on how certain the spam filter is that the email is spam.  In the case of 
SpamAssassin, this could be based on the number of rules the email matches while in 
the case of a Bayesian filter system it could be based on the spam probability 
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calculation of the email.  Also, investigation could be carried out into the feasibility 
of dynamic threshold value adjustment, based on current system load.   
 
Further research could also be undertaken on the current incremental suspicion 
system.  An investigation could be carried out into the feasibility of using 
mathematical probabilities for the classification of IPs instead of arbitrary suspicion 
values.  This could increase the accuracy of the system and provide extra assurance 
that legitimate emails are not being blocked by the system.  To do this a thorough 
investigation would need to be carried out into the distinct proportions of spam email 
contained within the live audit logs in order to determine the probability that an IP is 
malicious or benign in intent. 
 
The static ban length and benign classification length as set in the current system can 
also be examined.  The figures in Table 5.5 indicate that IP addresses classified as 
benign should stay on the Benign IP table for a longer time period than the current 
system value of 24 hours.  Investigation into the appropriate value for this time 
period has the potential to improve both the accuracy and the timeliness of the 
system.  These time periods could also be set according to each individual IPs 
suspicion value at the time of classification.  The larger the suspicion value, the 
longer amount of time the IP stays banned from the system of on the Benign IP table.  
The number of times the IP has been classified as malicious or benign could also 
influence the ban or benign length. 
 
Outbound mail logs could be analysed to provide further insight into determining if 
an IP is malicious or benign.  If an email address from the network has sent messages 
to other mail exchanges, there is a high likelihood that mail received from those 
exchanges is legitimate.  This would essentially be adding support for email 
communication sessions, as mail received by the external exchange could be left 
unfiltered by the system for a period of time after communication from inside the 
network has commenced. 
 
Email precursors found in Phase 1, although deemed not useful in the context of 
identifying the impending arrival of spam, may be useful in detecting the IP 
addresses of zombie machines compromised by Internet worms.  If a unique activity 
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pattern, such as sending port scans and then sending spam can be used to identify 
compromised machines, this information could be used to protect the network from 
further attack and could also be used to inform the administrators of other networks 
about potential zombie activity. 
 
In conclusion, this research has shown that it is viable to build a real-time system 
using audit log analysis techniques to stop spam at the network gateway.  The use of 
amalgamated audit logs from multiple gateways has also shown that the entire 
network can be protected in the same way.  Furthermore, this thesis has created a 
platform for future research within the area of spam detection and its prevention at 
the network gateway.   
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